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Nameservers · These nameservers report their software version via version.bind/version.server, which helps attackers find known vulnerabilities: a1-130.akam.net: "41824.8"; a11-67.akam.net: "41824.4"; a14-64.akam.net: "48878.27"; a14-64.akam.net: "48878.32"; a16-65.akam.net: "48878.29"; a16-65.akam.net: "48878.31"; a6-66.akam.net: "48878.32"; a6-66.akam.net: "48878.26"; a7-67.akam.net: "41824.9". Hide or replace the version string.

SOA · The nameservers serve different versions of the zone: 2026102118 on a1-130.akam.net (193.108.91.130), a1-130.akam.net (2600:1401:2::82), a11-67.akam.net (84.53.139.67), a11-67.akam.net (2600:1480:1::43), a14-64.akam.net (184.26.161.64), a14-64.akam.net (2600:1480:1800::40), a16-65.akam.net (23.211.132.65), a16-65.akam.net (2600:1406:1b::41), a6-66.akam.net (23.211.133.66), a6-66.akam.net (2600:1401:1::42), a7-67.akam.net (23.61.199.67), a7-67.akam.net (2600:1406:32::43); 2026102200 on ns11.netuse.de (52.137.9.10). This is normal for a few minutes after a change; if it lasts, zone transfers to the secondaries are failing.

DNSSEC · NSEC3 uses 15 iterations and a 8-byte salt. RFC 9276 recommends 0 iterations and no salt: extra iterations cost resolvers CPU and add no real protection, and some validators treat high counts as insecure.

SPF · SPF record uses ?all (neutral), which gives no protection against unauthorized senders. Use -all or ~all instead.

MX · Only one MX record found. For better email reliability, consider adding at least one backup MX server.

DMARC · DMARC subdomain policy is sp=none, so spoofed mail from subdomains is not blocked. Consider sp=quarantine or sp=reject.

DKIM · 1024-bit RSA keys are the minimum and are considered weak today: selector1 (1024 bits). Rotate to a 2048-bit key.

TLS · MTA-STS is not configured, so other mail servers fall back to unencrypted delivery when TLS fails or is stripped by an attacker. Publish a _mta-sts TXT record and a policy at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.