delpher.nl

.nl country-code

Found

TLD

.nl (country-code)

ICANN policies apply

no

Checks

• i

  .nl is a country-code TLD (ccTLD)

  Country-code TLD: governed by its local registry under national policy, not by an ICANN contract. Registrar accreditation, dispute resolution and RDAP/WHOIS rules are set by the registry.

  #1
• ✓ TLD delegated and signed #2

  .nl is delegated in the root zone and DNSSEC-signed.
• i

  Could not be checked

  The RDAP lookup failed, so this could not be checked: https://rdap.sidn.nl/domain/delpher.nl returned HTTP 429

  #3

ns1.surfnet.nl, ns1.zurich.surf.net

Found

Parent zone

nl

Delegation from

ns1.dns.nl (194.0.28.53)

NS at the parent

ns1.surfnet.nl, ns1.zurich.surf.net

NS in the zone

ns1.surfnet.nl, ns1.zurich.surf.net

Checks

• i

  2 nameservers

  Two nameservers meet the minimum; RFC 2182 recommends three or more for important zones: ns1.surfnet.nl, ns1.zurich.surf.net.

  #6
• ✓ Parent and zone agree #7

  The parent delegation and the zone's NS records list the same nameservers.
• ✓ No glue needed #8

  All nameservers are outside the zone, so no glue records are needed.
• ✓ All names resolve #9

  Every nameserver name has an address and is not an alias.
• ✓ Nameservers in different networks #10

  The nameservers are spread over 2 IPv4 /24s and 2 IPv6 /48s.
• ✓ 2 autonomous systems #11

  The nameservers are spread over: AS1103 (SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V., NL): 2 addresses; AS559 (Switch - SWITCH, CH): 2 addresses.
• ✓ Nameserver names under 2 TLDs #12

  Nameserver names use the TLDs .net, .nl.
• ✓ All reachable over IPv6 #13

  Every nameserver has an IPv6 address.

4 of 4 addresses answer authoritatively

Found

Checks

• ✓ All respond #14

  All 4 nameserver addresses answered.
• ✓ All authoritative #15

  Every responding nameserver answers authoritatively for the zone.
• ✓ No recursion #16

  The nameservers do not answer recursive queries for other domains.
• i

  Identifying string disclosed

  These nameservers answer version queries with a string that is not a version number: ns1.surfnet.nl: "This is a SURFnet nameserver - dns-beheer@surfnet.nl"; ns1.zurich.surf.net: "This is a SURFnet nameserver - dns-beheer@surf.nl".

  #17
• ✓ Zone transfers refused #18

  No nameserver allows a zone transfer to the public.
• ✓ TCP supported #19

  All nameservers answer over TCP.
• ✓ EDNS supported #20

  All nameservers support EDNS(0).
• ✓ Public addresses #21

  All nameserver addresses are publicly routable.

serial 2015025255 · primary ns1-konbib.kb.nl

Found

Primary (MNAME)

ns1-konbib.kb.nl

Contact (RNAME)

postmaster.kb.nl

Serial

2015025255

Refresh / retry

10800 s / 1080 s

Expire

2419200 s

Negative TTL

900 s

Serial per nameserver

Checks

• ✓ Serial 2015025255 everywhere #22

  All nameservers serve the same version of the zone.
• ✓ Timers within recommendations #23

  SOA refresh 3h, retry 18m, expire 28d, negative TTL 15m.
• i

  Hidden master (not resolvable)

  The primary nameserver ns1-konbib.kb.nl is not listed as a nameserver and does not resolve publicly: a hidden master, or a placeholder name. Some tools (e.g. dynamic updates) use MNAME to find the primary.

  #24
• ✓ Contact postmaster@kb.nl #25

  The SOA RNAME postmaster.kb.nl means postmaster@kb.nl.
• ✓ Timestamp serial #26

  The serial 2015025255 is a Unix timestamp (2033-11-08 01:14 UTC).

Signed, DS published at parent

Found

Validated by resolver

yes

Denial of existence

NSEC

Signatures valid until

25 October 2026

DS at the parent

DNSKEY in the zone

Checks

• ✓ Signed and validated #27

  The zone is signed, the parent publishes a DS record, and the resolver validates the answers.
• ✓ DS matches a key #28

  The DS record at the parent matches a key in the zone: key tag 59412 (SHA256).
• ✓ Modern algorithms #29

  Key algorithms: ECDSAP256SHA256 (13).
• ✓ Short-lived signatures (online signing) #30

  Signatures are valid for 97h0m0s and created on demand; the current one was made at 2026-10-21 18:10 UTC and expires at 2026-10-25 18:43 UTC.
• i

  NSEC

  The zone uses NSEC, so its full contents can be listed by walking the NSEC chain. That is fine unless the names are sensitive.

  #31