Mail domain report: foerdefunk.de

SPF

pass

SPF record published

Found

Record: v=spf1 +a +mx include:_spf.kserver.org -all
DNS lookups: 4 of 10
Void lookups: 0 of 2

Checks

✓ No deprecated ptr mechanism #1

No ptr mechanism found in SPF record.
✓ 4 of 10 DNS lookups #2

SPF record needs 4 DNS lookups (limit is 10).
✓ Ends with -all #3

SPF record properly uses -all to restrict unauthorized senders.
✓ Record published #6

SPF record exists for this domain.
✓ Single record #16

Exactly one SPF record is published.
✓ Valid syntax #25

All SPF mechanisms and modifiers are valid.
✓ No void lookups #26

All include/redirect targets exist.
✓ No overly broad IP ranges #27

All ip4/ip6 ranges are narrow enough.

DMARC

warn

p=quarantine (_dmarc.foerdefunk.de)

Found

Record: v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r;
Found at: _dmarc.foerdefunk.de

Tag	Value	Meaning
v	DMARC1	Version
p	quarantine	Policy
adkim	r	DKIM alignment (r = relaxed, s = strict)
aspf	r	SPF alignment (r = relaxed, s = strict)

Checks

!

Policy: quarantine

DMARC policy is set to 'quarantine'. Consider upgrading to 'reject' for stronger protection once you've verified legitimate emails are passing authentication.

#4
✓ Record published #5

DMARC record exists for this domain.
✓ Valid syntax #17

DMARC record syntax is valid.
✓ Applies to 100% of mail #18

DMARC policy applies to all failing mail.
!

No aggregate reports (rua)

DMARC record has no rua tag, so you receive no aggregate reports about who sends mail as your domain. Add rua=mailto:...

#19
✓ Subdomain policy: quarantine #20

Subdomains are covered by policy 'quarantine'.

DKIM

warn

No keys found under the checked selectors

Found

Selectors: None found
_domainkey: NOERROR

Checks

!

No key under common selectors

The _domainkey name exists but no DKIM key was found under the common selectors. Selectors are provider-specific; check yours with -selector.

#7

DNSSEC

warn

Not signed

Found

DNSKEY records: No (0)
DS at parent: No

Checks

!

Not enabled

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. Consider enabling DNSSEC to protect against DNS spoofing attacks.

#8

MX

warn

3 mail servers

Found

Priority	Host	Records	Reverse DNS
13	mx1.kserver.org	A 213.178.70.233	bravo.kserver.org ✓
37	mx2.kserver.org	A 85.13.136.20	dd14628.kasserver.com ✓
42	mx3.kserver.org	A 213.178.78.250	no PTR

Checks

✓ 3 MX records #9

Found 3 MX records for this domain.
✓ All hosts resolve #10

All MX records resolve to valid IP addresses.
!

Hosts without IPv6

The following MX hosts could not be resolved to IPv6 addresses: mx1.kserver.org, mx2.kserver.org, mx3.kserver.org

#11
✓ Redundant MX hosts #12

Found 3 MX records, which provides redundancy for email delivery.
✓ At most 5 MX records #13

Found 3 MX records, which is within the recommended range (1-5).
✓ No localhost targets #14

No MX records pointing to localhost found.
✓ No private IP addresses #15

No MX records resolving to private IP addresses found.
✓ No CNAME targets #22

No MX records point to a CNAME.
!

Addresses without reverse DNS

These MX addresses have no PTR record, which many receivers treat as a spam signal: 213.178.78.250 (mx3.kserver.org). Ask your hosting provider to set one.

#30

TLS

warn

no MTA-STS · no TLS-RPT · DANE on 0 of 3 MX hosts

Found

DANE (TLSA records)

MX host	TLSA	DNSSEC
mx1.kserver.org	none	-
mx2.kserver.org	none	-
mx3.kserver.org	none	-

Checks

!

Not configured

MTA-STS is not configured, so other mail servers fall back to unencrypted delivery when TLS fails or is stripped by an attacker. Publish a _mta-sts TXT record and a policy at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

#32
i

Not configured

TLS-RPT lets senders report TLS delivery problems to you. It is most useful together with MTA-STS or DANE.

#35
i

Not used

No MX host publishes TLSA records. DANE lets senders verify your mail server's certificate through DNSSEC; it requires DNSSEC on the MX host's zone.

#36

BIMI

info

No BIMI record

Checks

i

Not configured

BIMI shows your logo next to your mail in supporting mail clients. It requires DMARC enforcement.

#38