han.nl

.nl country-code

Found

TLD

.nl (country-code)

ICANN policies apply

no

Checks

• i

  .nl is a country-code TLD (ccTLD)

  Country-code TLD: governed by its local registry under national policy, not by an ICANN contract. Registrar accreditation, dispute resolution and RDAP/WHOIS rules are set by the registry.

  #1
• ✓ TLD delegated and signed #2

  .nl is delegated in the root zone and DNSSEC-signed.
• i

  Could not be checked

  The RDAP lookup failed, so this could not be checked: https://rdap.sidn.nl/domain/han.nl returned HTTP 429

  #3

ns.han.nl, ns1.han.nl

Found

Parent zone

nl

Delegation from

ns1.dns.nl (194.0.28.53)

NS at the parent

ns.han.nl, ns1.han.nl

NS in the zone

ns.han.nl, ns1.han.nl

Checks

• i

  2 nameservers

  Two nameservers meet the minimum; RFC 2182 recommends three or more for important zones: ns.han.nl, ns1.han.nl.

  #6
• ✓ Parent and zone agree #7

  The parent delegation and the zone's NS records list the same nameservers.
• ✓ Glue present and correct #8

  Glue is published for the nameservers inside the zone: ns.han.nl, ns1.han.nl.
• ✓ All names resolve #9

  Every nameserver name has an address and is not an alias.
• i

  One address family in one network

  all IPv6 addresses are in 2001:610:468::/48, while the other address family is spread over several networks.

  #10
• i

  All nameservers in one AS

  All nameserver addresses are announced by one network operator (AS1103 (SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V., NL): 4 addresses). An outage or attack on that network affects all nameservers; large anycast providers mitigate this, but a secondary DNS provider adds independence.

  #11
• i

  All nameserver names under .nl

  All nameserver names are under one TLD, so a problem with that TLD also makes the nameservers unreachable. Some operators use names under two TLDs for extra resilience.

  #12
• ✓ All reachable over IPv6 #13

  Every nameserver has an IPv6 address.

4 of 4 addresses answer authoritatively

Found

Checks

• ✓ All respond #14

  All 4 nameserver addresses answered.
• ✓ All authoritative #15

  Every responding nameserver answers authoritatively for the zone.
• ✓ No recursion #16

  The nameservers do not answer recursive queries for other domains.
• i

  Identifying string disclosed

  These nameservers answer version queries with a string that is not a version number: ns.han.nl: "This is a HAN nameserver - dnsbeheer@han.nl"; ns1.han.nl: "This is a HAN nameserver - dnsbeheer@han.nl".

  #17
• ✓ Zone transfers refused #18

  No nameserver allows a zone transfer to the public.
• ✓ TCP supported #19

  All nameservers answer over TCP.
• ✓ EDNS supported #20

  All nameservers support EDNS(0).
• ✓ Public addresses #21

  All nameserver addresses are publicly routable.

Signed, DS published at parent

Found

Validated by resolver

yes

Denial of existence

NSEC

Signatures valid until

16 November 2026

DS at the parent

DNSKEY in the zone

Checks

• ✓ Signed and validated #27

  The zone is signed, the parent publishes a DS record, and the resolver validates the answers.
• ✓ DS matches a key #28

  The DS record at the parent matches a key in the zone: key tag 29582 (SHA256).
• ✓ Modern algorithms #29

  Key algorithms: ECDSAP256SHA256 (13).
• ✓ Signatures valid until 2026-11-16 #30

  The earliest DNSKEY/SOA signature expires at 2026-11-16 17:57 UTC.
• i

  NSEC

  The zone uses NSEC, so its full contents can be listed by walking the NSEC chain. That is fine unless the names are sensitive.

  #31