ingolstadt.de

.de country-code

Found

TLD

.de (country-code)

ICANN policies apply

no

Checks

• i

  .de is a country-code TLD (ccTLD)

  Country-code TLD: governed by its local registry under national policy, not by an ICANN contract. Registrar accreditation, dispute resolution and RDAP/WHOIS rules are set by the registry.

  #1
• ✓ TLD delegated and signed #2

  .de is delegated in the root zone and DNSSEC-signed.
• i

  Registration data not available

  No registration data via RDAP: the registry of .de offers no RDAP service. Many ccTLD registries don't offer RDAP; check the registry's WHOIS instead.

  #3

ns3.com-in.net, ns4.com-in.net

Found

Parent zone

de

Delegation from

a.nic.de (194.0.0.53)

NS at the parent

ns3.com-in.net, ns4.com-in.net

NS in the zone

ns3.com-in.net, ns4.com-in.net

Checks

• i

  2 nameservers

  Two nameservers meet the minimum; RFC 2182 recommends three or more for important zones: ns3.com-in.net, ns4.com-in.net.

  #6
• ✓ Parent and zone agree #7

  The parent delegation and the zone's NS records list the same nameservers.
• ✓ No glue needed #8

  All nameservers are outside the zone, so no glue records are needed.
• ✓ All names resolve #9

  Every nameserver name has an address and is not an alias.
• i

  One address family in one network

  all IPv6 addresses are in 2a02:2760:79::/48, while the other address family is spread over several networks.

  #10
• i

  All nameservers in one AS

  All nameserver addresses are announced by one network operator (AS51402 (COM-IN - COM-IN Telekommunikations GmbH, DE): 4 addresses). An outage or attack on that network affects all nameservers; large anycast providers mitigate this, but a secondary DNS provider adds independence.

  #11
• i

  All nameserver names under .net

  All nameserver names are under one TLD, so a problem with that TLD also makes the nameservers unreachable. Some operators use names under two TLDs for extra resilience.

  #12
• ✓ All reachable over IPv6 #13

  Every nameserver has an IPv6 address.

Signed, DS published at parent

Found

Validated by resolver

yes

Denial of existence

NSEC

Signatures valid until

29 October 2026

DS at the parent

DNSKEY in the zone

Checks

• ✓ Signed and validated #27

  The zone is signed, the parent publishes a DS record, and the resolver validates the answers.
• ✓ DS matches a key #28

  The DS record at the parent matches a key in the zone: key tag 16559 (SHA256).
• ✓ Modern algorithms #29

  Key algorithms: ECDSAP256SHA256 (13).
• ✓ Signatures valid until 2026-10-29 #30

  The earliest DNSKEY/SOA signature expires at 2026-10-29 00:00 UTC.
• i

  NSEC

  The zone uses NSEC, so its full contents can be listed by walking the NSEC chain. That is fine unless the names are sensitive.

  #31