kas.de

Delegation · The nameservers at the parent and in the zone should be the same. Only in the zone: c.ns14.net. b.ns14.net, c.ns14.net, ns.kas.de report NS b.ns14.net c.ns14.net ns.kas.de.

Nameservers · These nameservers report their software version via version.bind/version.server, which helps attackers find known vulnerabilities: ns.kas.de: "9.20.24". Hide or replace the version string.

DNSSEC · The zone is signed but the parent has no DS record, so the signatures are not used. Publish the DS record at your registrar.

DNSSEC · SHA-1 based algorithms are deprecated and rejected by some validators: RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 (7). Roll over to ECDSAP256SHA256 (13).

DNSSEC · NSEC3 uses 0 iterations and a 8-byte salt. RFC 9276 recommends 0 iterations and no salt: extra iterations cost resolvers CPU and add no real protection, and some validators treat high counts as insecure.

DMARC · DMARC policy is set to 'quarantine'. Consider upgrading to 'reject' for stronger protection once you've verified legitimate emails are passing authentication.

DNSSEC · The zone is signed (DNSKEY present) but the parent has no DS record, so the chain of trust is incomplete. Publish the DS record at your registrar.

MX · Only one MX record found. For better email reliability, consider adding at least one backup MX server.

DKIM · 1024-bit RSA keys are the minimum and are considered weak today: selector1 (1024 bits). Rotate to a 2048-bit key.

TLS · MTA-STS is not configured, so other mail servers fall back to unencrypted delivery when TLS fails or is stripped by an attacker. Publish a _mta-sts TXT record and a policy at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.