naturallabs.fr

ns1.aftermarket.pl, ns2.aftermarket.pl

Found

Parent zone

fr

Delegation from

d.nic.fr (194.0.9.1)

NS at the parent

ns1.aftermarket.pl, ns2.aftermarket.pl

NS in the zone

ns1.aftermarket.pl, ns2.aftermarket.pl

Checks

• i

  2 nameservers

  Two nameservers meet the minimum; RFC 2182 recommends three or more for important zones: ns1.aftermarket.pl, ns2.aftermarket.pl.

  #6
• ✓ Parent and zone agree #7

  The parent delegation and the zone's NS records list the same nameservers.
• ✓ No glue needed #8

  All nameservers are outside the zone, so no glue records are needed.
• ✓ All names resolve #9

  Every nameserver name has an address and is not an alias.
• ✓ Nameservers in different networks #10

  The nameservers are spread over 2 IPv4 /24s and 0 IPv6 /48s.
• i

  All nameservers in one AS

  All nameserver addresses are announced by one network operator (AS48707 (AS48707-OPS-PL - AS48707 OPS PL sp. z o.o., PL): 2 addresses). An outage or attack on that network affects all nameservers; large anycast providers mitigate this, but a secondary DNS provider adds independence.

  #11
• i

  All nameserver names under .pl

  All nameserver names are under one TLD, so a problem with that TLD also makes the nameservers unreachable. Some operators use names under two TLDs for extra resilience.

  #12
• !

  No IPv6

  None of the nameservers has an IPv6 address, so IPv6-only resolvers can't reach them.

  #13

2 of 2 addresses answer authoritatively

Found

Checks

• ✓ All respond #14

  All 2 nameserver addresses answered.
• ✓ All authoritative #15

  Every responding nameserver answers authoritatively for the zone.
• ✓ No recursion #16

  The nameservers do not answer recursive queries for other domains.
• !

  Software version disclosed

  These nameservers report their software version via version.bind/version.server, which helps attackers find known vulnerabilities: ns1.aftermarket.pl: "PowerDNS Authoritative Server 4.9.17 (built Aug 5 2026 13:27:37 by root@localhost)"; ns2.aftermarket.pl: "PowerDNS Authoritative Server 4.9.17 (built Aug 5 2026 13:27:37 by root@localhost)". Hide or replace the version string.

  #17
• ✓ Zone transfers refused #18

  No nameserver allows a zone transfer to the public.
• ✓ TCP supported #19

  All nameservers answer over TCP.
• ✓ EDNS supported #20

  All nameservers support EDNS(0).
• ✓ Public addresses #21

  All nameserver addresses are publicly routable.

serial 2610021200 · primary ns1.aftermarket.pl

Found

Primary (MNAME)

ns1.aftermarket.pl

Contact (RNAME)

kontakt.aftermarket.pl

Serial

2610021200

Refresh / retry

3600 s / 15 s

Expire

86400 s

Negative TTL

3600 s

Serial per nameserver

Checks

• ✓ Serial 2610021200 everywhere #22

  All nameservers serve the same version of the zone.
• !

  Unusual SOA timers

  expire 1d is shorter than 7d; secondaries stop answering too soon when the primary is down. Current values: refresh 1h, retry 15s, expire 1d, negative TTL 1h.

  #23
• ✓ Primary is a public nameserver #24

  The primary nameserver ns1.aftermarket.pl is one of the listed nameservers.
• ✓ Contact kontakt@aftermarket.pl #25

  The SOA RNAME kontakt.aftermarket.pl means kontakt@aftermarket.pl.
• ✓ Timestamp serial #26

  The serial 2610021200 is a Unix timestamp (2052-09-15 13:53 UTC).

Signed, DS published at parent

Found

Validated by resolver

yes

Denial of existence

NSEC3

NSEC3

1 iterations, 1-byte salt

Signatures valid until

5 November 2026

DS at the parent

DNSKEY in the zone

Checks

• ✓ Signed and validated #27

  The zone is signed, the parent publishes a DS record, and the resolver validates the answers.
• ✓ DS matches a key #28

  The DS record at the parent matches a key in the zone: key tag 48531 (SHA256), key tag 27980 (SHA256).
• ✓ Modern algorithms #29

  Key algorithms: ECDSAP256SHA256 (13).
• ✓ Signatures valid until 2026-11-05 #30

  The earliest DNSKEY/SOA signature expires at 2026-11-05 00:00 UTC.
• !

  NSEC3 with extra iterations or salt

  NSEC3 uses 1 iteration and a 1-byte salt. RFC 9276 recommends 0 iterations and no salt: extra iterations cost resolvers CPU and add no real protection, and some validators treat high counts as insecure.

  #31