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Nameservers · These nameservers report their software version via version.bind/version.server, which helps attackers find known vulnerabilities: a1-130.akam.net: "41824.11"; a1-130.akam.net: "41824.8"; a11-67.akam.net: "41824.10"; a11-67.akam.net: "41824.4"; a14-64.akam.net: "48878.26"; a14-64.akam.net: "48878.29"; a16-65.akam.net: "48878.29"; a16-65.akam.net: "48878.30"; a6-66.akam.net: "48878.31"; a6-66.akam.net: "48878.26"; a7-67.akam.net: "41824.9"; a7-67.akam.net: "41824.6". Hide or replace the version string.

DNSSEC · The zone is signed but the parent has no DS record, so the signatures are not used. Publish the DS record at your registrar.

Records · These records have a TTL below 5m, causing extra queries and slower lookups: A (20s). Low TTLs are useful just before a planned change. The NS TTL at the parent is 1d and in the zone 1h; resolvers may use either.

SPF · SPF record uses ?all (neutral), which gives no protection against unauthorized senders. Use -all or ~all instead.

DNSSEC · The zone is signed (DNSKEY present) but the parent has no DS record, so the chain of trust is incomplete. Publish the DS record at your registrar.

MX · Only one MX record found. For better email reliability, consider adding at least one backup MX server.

DMARC · DMARC subdomain policy is sp=none, so spoofed mail from subdomains is not blocked. Consider sp=quarantine or sp=reject.

DNSSEC · DNSKEY signatures expire at 2026-10-24T20:55:30Z (in 68h0m0s). Check that re-signing works.

DKIM · 1024-bit RSA keys are the minimum and are considered weak today: selector1 (1024 bits). Rotate to a 2048-bit key.

TLS · MTA-STS is not configured, so other mail servers fall back to unencrypted delivery when TLS fails or is stripped by an attacker. Publish a _mta-sts TXT record and a policy at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.