Mail domain report: sydneyoperahouse.com

SPF

warn

SPF record published

Found

Record: v=spf1 ip4:148.163.149.33 ip4:148.163.153.32 exists:%{i}._spf.mta.salesforce.com ip4:209.61.151.0/24 ip4:166.78.68.0/22 ip4:198.61.254.0/23 ip4:192.237.158.0/23 ip4:23.253.182.0/23 ip4:104.130.96.0/28 ip4:146.20.113.0/24 ip4:146.20.191.0/24 ip4:159.135.224.0/20 ip4:69.72.32.0/20 ip4:104.130.122.0/23 ip4:146.20.112.0/26 ip4:161.38.192.0/20 ip4:143.55.224.0/21 ip4:143.55.232.0/22 ip4:159.112.240.0/20 ip4:198.244.48.0/20 ip4:204.220.168.0/21 ip4:204.220.176.0/20 ip4:141.193.32.0/23 ip4:159.135.140.80/29 ip4:159.135.132.128/25 ip4:161.38.204.0/22 ip4:87.253.232.0/21 ip4:185.189.236.0/22 ip4:185.211.120.0/22 ip4:185.250.236.0/22 ip4:143.55.236.0/22 ip4:198.244.60.0/22 ip4:204.220.160.0/21 ip4:40.92.0.0/15 ip4:40.107.0.0/16 ip4:52.100.0.0/15 ip4:52.102.0.0/16 ip4:52.103.0.0/17 ip4:104.47.0.0/17 ip6:2a01:111:f400::/48 ip6:2a01:111:f403::/49 ip6:2a01:111:f403:8000::/51 ip6:2a01:111:f403:c000::/51 ip6:2a01:111:f403:f000::/52 ip4:103.151.192.0/23 ip4:54.252.177.62 ip4:152.160.0.0/16 ip4:167.89.0.0/17 ip4:208.117.48.0/20 ip4:50.31.32.0/19 ip4:198.37.144.0/20 ip4:198.21.0.0/21 ip4:192.254.112.0/20 ip4:168.245.0.0/17 ip4:149.72.0.0/16 ip4:159.183.0.0/16 ip4:134.128.64.0/19 ip4:134.128.96.0/19 ip4:223.165.113.0/24 ip4:223.165.115.0/24 ip4:223.165.118.0/23 ip4:223.165.120.0/23 -all
DNS lookups: 1 of 10
Void lookups: 0 of 2

Checks

✓ No deprecated ptr mechanism #1

No ptr mechanism found in SPF record.
✓ 1 of 10 DNS lookups #2

SPF record needs 1 DNS lookups (limit is 10).
✓ Ends with -all #3

SPF record properly uses -all to restrict unauthorized senders.
✓ Record published #6

SPF record exists for this domain.
✓ Single record #16

Exactly one SPF record is published.
✓ Valid syntax #25

All SPF mechanisms and modifiers are valid.
✓ No void lookups #26

All include/redirect targets exist.
!

Broad IP ranges

These ranges authorize tens of thousands of addresses or more: ip4:40.92.0.0/15, ip4:52.100.0.0/15. Check that you really own and send from all of them.

#27

DMARC

pass

p=reject (_dmarc.sydneyoperahouse.com)

Found

Record: v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:1aef407c4fce363@rep.dmarcanalyzer.com,mailto:dmarc_agg@dmarc.everest.email; ruf=mailto:1aef407c4fce363@for.dmarcanalyzer.com,mailto:dmarc_fr@dmarc.everest.email
Found at: _dmarc.sydneyoperahouse.com
External report address: mailto:1aef407c4fce363@rep.dmarcanalyzer.com (authorized)
External report address: mailto:dmarc_agg@dmarc.everest.email (authorized)
External report address: mailto:1aef407c4fce363@for.dmarcanalyzer.com (authorized)
External report address: mailto:dmarc_fr@dmarc.everest.email (authorized)

Tag	Value	Meaning
v	DMARC1	Version
p	reject	Policy
rua	mailto:1aef407c4fce363@rep.dmarcanalyzer.com,mailto:dmarc_agg@dmarc.everest.email	Aggregate report addresses
ruf	mailto:1aef407c4fce363@for.dmarcanalyzer.com,mailto:dmarc_fr@dmarc.everest.email	Failure report addresses
fo	1	Failure reporting options

Checks

✓ Policy: reject #4

DMARC policy is set to 'reject', which provides the strongest protection against email spoofing.
✓ Record published #5

DMARC record exists for this domain.
✓ Valid syntax #17

DMARC record syntax is valid.
✓ Applies to 100% of mail #18

DMARC policy applies to all failing mail.
✓ Aggregate reports enabled #19

Aggregate reports are sent to: mailto:1aef407c4fce363@rep.dmarcanalyzer.com, mailto:dmarc_agg@dmarc.everest.email
✓ Subdomain policy: reject #20

Subdomains are covered by policy 'reject'.
✓ External report addresses authorized #29

Report addresses in other domains have published their authorization.

DKIM

warn

Selectors: k1

Found

Selectors: k1
_domainkey: NXDOMAIN

Selector	Key	Flags
k1	RSA 1024 bits

Checks

✓ Keys found: k1 #7

DKIM keys found for this domain with selectors: k1
!

1024-bit DKIM key

1024-bit RSA keys are the minimum and are considered weak today: k1 (1024 bits). Rotate to a 2048-bit key.

#23
✓ No problematic flags #24

No keys in test mode, revoked, or limited to SHA-1.

DNSSEC

warn

Not signed

Found

DNSKEY records: No (0)
DS at parent: No

Checks

!

Not enabled

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. Consider enabling DNSSEC to protect against DNS spoofing attacks.

#8

MX

warn

2 mail servers

Found

Priority	Host	Records	Reverse DNS
10	mxa-0023fe01.gslb.pphosted.com	A 148.163.149.33	mx0a-0023fe01.pphosted.com ✓
10	mxb-0023fe01.gslb.pphosted.com	A 148.163.153.32	mx0b-0023fe01.pphosted.com ✓

Checks

✓ 2 MX records #9

Found 2 MX records for this domain.
✓ All hosts resolve #10

All MX records resolve to valid IP addresses.
!

Hosts without IPv6

The following MX hosts could not be resolved to IPv6 addresses: mxa-0023fe01.gslb.pphosted.com, mxb-0023fe01.gslb.pphosted.com

#11
✓ Redundant MX hosts #12

Found 2 MX records, which provides redundancy for email delivery.
✓ At most 5 MX records #13

Found 2 MX records, which is within the recommended range (1-5).
✓ No localhost targets #14

No MX records pointing to localhost found.
✓ No private IP addresses #15

No MX records resolving to private IP addresses found.
✓ No CNAME targets #22

No MX records point to a CNAME.
✓ Reverse DNS confirmed #30

All 2 MX addresss have a PTR record that resolves back to them.

TLS

warn

no MTA-STS · no TLS-RPT · DANE on 0 of 2 MX hosts

Found

DANE (TLSA records)

MX host	TLSA	DNSSEC
mxa-0023fe01.gslb.pphosted.com	none	-
mxb-0023fe01.gslb.pphosted.com	none	-

Checks

!

Not configured

MTA-STS is not configured, so other mail servers fall back to unencrypted delivery when TLS fails or is stripped by an attacker. Publish a _mta-sts TXT record and a policy at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

#32
i

Not configured

TLS-RPT lets senders report TLS delivery problems to you. It is most useful together with MTA-STS or DANE.

#35
i

Not used

No MX host publishes TLSA records. DANE lets senders verify your mail server's certificate through DNSSEC; it requires DNSSEC on the MX host's zone.

#36

BIMI

info

No BIMI record

Checks

i

Not configured

BIMI shows your logo next to your mail in supporting mail clients. It requires DMARC enforcement.

#38