SurfaceMap › t › thws.de

thws.de

Checked 2026-10-22 00:40 UTC · first added 2026-10-21
✗Problems found Score 60 of 100

Domain & DNS

warn

21 passed 4 warn 0 failed

Areas

iRegistration !Delegation iNameservers ✓SOA !DNSSEC ✓Records

Problems

  • !
    NS sets differ
    Delegation · The nameservers at the parent and in the zone should be the same. Only in the zone: dns-1.dfn.de. dns-1.dfn.de, ns1.fhws.de, ns2.fhws.de report NS dns-1.dfn.de ns1.fhws.de ns2.fhws.de.
    #7
  • !
    Signed but not delegated securely
    DNSSEC · The zone is signed but the parent has no DS record, so the signatures are not used. Publish the DS record at your registrar.
    #27
  • !
    Signatures expire soon
    DNSSEC · The earliest signature expires at 2026-10-27 00:53 UTC (in 120h0m0s). Check that automatic re-signing works.
    #30
  • !
    NSEC3 with extra iterations or salt
    DNSSEC · NSEC3 uses 50 iterations and a 16-byte salt. RFC 9276 recommends 0 iterations and no salt: extra iterations cost resolvers CPU and add no real protection, and some validators treat high counts as insecure.
    #31

Recent checks

!

Full report

Domain & DNS report for thws.de ›

Mail

fail

23 passed 6 warn 1 failed

Areas

✓SPF ✗DMARC !DKIM !DNSSEC !MX !TLS iBIMI

Problems

  • ✗
    Policy: none (monitoring only)
    DMARC · DMARC policy is set to 'none', which only monitors but doesn't protect against spoofing. Consider upgrading to 'quarantine' or ideally 'reject'.
    #4
  • !
    Signed, but no DS at parent
    DNSSEC · The zone is signed (DNSKEY present) but the parent has no DS record, so the chain of trust is incomplete. Publish the DS record at your registrar.
    #8
  • !
    Hosts without IPv6
    MX · The following MX hosts could not be resolved to IPv6 addresses: a2801.mx.srv.dfn.de, b2801.mx.srv.dfn.de, c2801.mx.srv.dfn.de
    #11
  • !
    Signatures expire in 120h0m0s
    DNSSEC · DNSKEY signatures expire at 2026-10-27T00:53:47Z (in 120h0m0s). Check that re-signing works.
    #21
  • !
    1024-bit DKIM key
    DKIM · 1024-bit RSA keys are the minimum and are considered weak today: mail (1024 bits), s1 (1024 bits). Rotate to a 2048-bit key.
    #23
  • !
    Not configured
    TLS · MTA-STS is not configured, so other mail servers fall back to unencrypted delivery when TLS fails or is stripped by an attacker. Publish a _mta-sts TXT record and a policy at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
    #32
  • !
    Not configured
    TLS · MTA-STS or DANE is used without TLS-RPT, so you get no reports when senders fail to deliver because of TLS problems. Publish _smtp._tls TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:...".
    #35

Recent checks

✗

Full report

Mail report for thws.de ›