velora.be

Checked 22 October 2026, 07:21 UTC · via 8.8.8.8
!Passed with warnings
25 passed 2 warnings 0 failed 6 info

Registration

info

.be country-code

Found

TLD
.be (country-code)
ICANN policies apply
no

Checks

  • i
    .be is a country-code TLD (ccTLD)
    Country-code TLD: governed by its local registry under national policy, not by an ICANN contract. Registrar accreditation, dispute resolution and RDAP/WHOIS rules are set by the registry.
    #1
  • ✓ TLD delegated and signed #2
    .be is delegated in the root zone and DNSSEC-signed.
  • i
    Registration data not available
    No registration data via RDAP: the registry of .be offers no RDAP service. Many ccTLD registries don't offer RDAP; check the registry's WHOIS instead.
    #3

Delegation

info

ns1.openprovider.nl, ns2.openprovider.be, ns3.openprovider.eu

Found

Parent zone
be
Delegation from
a.nsset.be (194.0.6.1)
NS at the parent
ns1.openprovider.nl, ns2.openprovider.be, ns3.openprovider.eu
NS in the zone
ns1.openprovider.nl, ns2.openprovider.be, ns3.openprovider.eu
NameserverAddressesNetwork (AS)Glue
ns1.openprovider.nl162.159.26.10 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:1a0aAS13335 CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US AS13335 CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US-
ns2.openprovider.be162.159.27.96 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:1b60AS13335 CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US AS13335 CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US-
ns3.openprovider.eu162.159.48.89 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:3059AS13335 CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US AS13335 CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US-

Checks

  • ✓ 3 nameservers #6
    Delegated to ns1.openprovider.nl, ns2.openprovider.be, ns3.openprovider.eu.
  • ✓ Parent and zone agree #7
    The parent delegation and the zone's NS records list the same nameservers.
  • ✓ No glue needed #8
    All nameservers are outside the zone, so no glue records are needed.
  • ✓ All names resolve #9
    Every nameserver name has an address and is not an alias.
  • i
    One address family in one network
    all IPv6 addresses are in 2400:cb00:2049::/48, while the other address family is spread over several networks.
    #10
  • i
    All nameservers in one AS
    All nameserver addresses are announced by one network operator (AS13335 (CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US): 6 addresses). An outage or attack on that network affects all nameservers; large anycast providers mitigate this, but a secondary DNS provider adds independence.
    #11
  • ✓ Nameserver names under 3 TLDs #12
    Nameserver names use the TLDs .be, .eu, .nl.
  • ✓ All reachable over IPv6 #13
    Every nameserver has an IPv6 address.

Nameservers

warn

6 of 6 addresses answer authoritatively

Found

NameserverAnswerRecursionTCP / EDNSAXFRVersion
ns1.openprovider.nl 162.159.26.10NOERROR, 27 ms, authoritativenoyes / yesrefused2026.10.8
ns1.openprovider.nl 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:1a0aNOERROR, 32 ms, authoritativenoyes / yesrefused2026.10.8
ns2.openprovider.be 162.159.27.96NOERROR, 29 ms, authoritativenoyes / yesrefused2026.10.8
ns2.openprovider.be 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:1b60NOERROR, 27 ms, authoritativenoyes / yesrefused2026.10.8
ns3.openprovider.eu 162.159.48.89NOERROR, 25 ms, authoritativenoyes / yesrefused2026.10.8
ns3.openprovider.eu 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:3059NOERROR, 26 ms, authoritativenoyes / yesrefused2026.10.8

Checks

  • ✓ All respond #14
    All 6 nameserver addresses answered.
  • ✓ All authoritative #15
    Every responding nameserver answers authoritatively for the zone.
  • ✓ No recursion #16
    The nameservers do not answer recursive queries for other domains.
  • !
    Software version disclosed
    These nameservers report their software version via version.bind/version.server, which helps attackers find known vulnerabilities: ns1.openprovider.nl: "2026.10.8"; ns2.openprovider.be: "2026.10.8"; ns3.openprovider.eu: "2026.10.8". Hide or replace the version string.
    #17
  • ✓ Zone transfers refused #18
    No nameserver allows a zone transfer to the public.
  • ✓ TCP supported #19
    All nameservers answer over TCP.
  • ✓ EDNS supported #20
    All nameservers support EDNS(0).
  • ✓ Public addresses #21
    All nameserver addresses are publicly routable.

SOA

pass

serial 2026042902 · primary ns1.openprovider.nl

Found

Primary (MNAME)
ns1.openprovider.nl
Contact (RNAME)
dns.openprovider.eu
Serial
2026042902
Refresh / retry
10800 s / 3600 s
Expire
604800 s
Negative TTL
3600 s

Serial per nameserver

NameserverSerial
ns1.openprovider.nl (162.159.26.10)2026042902
ns1.openprovider.nl (2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:1a0a)2026042902
ns2.openprovider.be (162.159.27.96)2026042902
ns2.openprovider.be (2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:1b60)2026042902
ns3.openprovider.eu (162.159.48.89)2026042902
ns3.openprovider.eu (2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:3059)2026042902

Checks

  • ✓ Serial 2026042902 everywhere #22
    All nameservers serve the same version of the zone.
  • ✓ Timers within recommendations #23
    SOA refresh 3h, retry 1h, expire 7d, negative TTL 1h.
  • ✓ Primary is a public nameserver #24
    The primary nameserver ns1.openprovider.nl is one of the listed nameservers.
  • ✓ Contact dns@openprovider.eu #25
    The SOA RNAME dns.openprovider.eu means dns@openprovider.eu.
  • ✓ Date-based serial #26
    The serial 2026042902 follows the YYYYMMDDnn convention (2026-04-29).

DNSSEC

warn

Signed, DS published at parent

Found

Validated by resolver
yes
Denial of existence
NSEC3
NSEC3
1 iterations, 1-byte salt
Signatures valid until
5 November 2026

DS at the parent

Key tagAlgorithmDigestMatches a key
48574RSASHA256 (8)SHA256 FF7D86AA8232E3E3…yes

DNSKEY in the zone

Key tagRoleAlgorithm
21531ZSK (256)RSASHA256 (8)
48574KSK (257)RSASHA256 (8)
4506ZSK (256)RSASHA256 (8)

Checks

  • ✓ Signed and validated #27
    The zone is signed, the parent publishes a DS record, and the resolver validates the answers.
  • ✓ DS matches a key #28
    The DS record at the parent matches a key in the zone: key tag 48574 (SHA256).
  • ✓ Modern algorithms #29
    Key algorithms: RSASHA256 (8).
  • ✓ Signatures valid until 2026-11-05 #30
    The earliest DNSKEY/SOA signature expires at 2026-11-05 00:00 UTC.
  • !
    NSEC3 with extra iterations or salt
    NSEC3 uses 1 iteration and a 1-byte salt. RFC 9276 recommends 0 iterations and no salt: extra iterations cost resolvers CPU and add no real protection, and some validators treat high counts as insecure.
    #31

Records

info

7 records at the apex

Found

Read from
162.159.26.10:53
TypeValueTTL
SOAns1.openprovider.nl. dns.openprovider.eu. 2026042902 10800 3600 604800 360086400
NSns2.openprovider.be.3600
NSns3.openprovider.eu.3600
NSns1.openprovider.nl.3600
A35.204.150.53600
MX0 mail.webador.com.3600
TXT"v=spf1 include:_spf.webador.com ~all"3600

Checks

  • ✓ TTLs within range #32
    TTLs: A 1h, MX 1h, NS 1h. The NS TTL at the parent is 1d and in the zone 1h; resolvers may use either.
  • ✓ No CNAME at the apex #33
    The zone apex has no CNAME record.
  • i
    Wildcard record
    A random name under the zone resolves, so there is a wildcard (*) record. Typos and non-existent hosts resolve too, which can confuse mail and certificate checks.
    #34
  • i
    No CAA records
    Without CAA records any certificate authority may issue certificates for this domain. A CAA record limits issuance to the CAs you use.
    #35