voys.nl

.nl country-code

Found

TLD

.nl (country-code)

ICANN policies apply

no

Checks

• i

  .nl is a country-code TLD (ccTLD)

  Country-code TLD: governed by its local registry under national policy, not by an ICANN contract. Registrar accreditation, dispute resolution and RDAP/WHOIS rules are set by the registry.

  #1
• ✓ TLD delegated and signed #2

  .nl is delegated in the root zone and DNSSEC-signed.
• i

  Could not be checked

  The RDAP lookup failed, so this could not be checked: https://rdap.sidn.nl/domain/voys.nl returned HTTP 429

  #3

kyrie.ns.cloudflare.com, walk.ns.cloudflare.com

Found

Parent zone

nl

Delegation from

ns1.dns.nl (194.0.28.53)

NS at the parent

kyrie.ns.cloudflare.com, walk.ns.cloudflare.com

NS in the zone

kyrie.ns.cloudflare.com, walk.ns.cloudflare.com

Checks

• i

  2 nameservers

  Two nameservers meet the minimum; RFC 2182 recommends three or more for important zones: kyrie.ns.cloudflare.com, walk.ns.cloudflare.com.

  #6
• ✓ Parent and zone agree #7

  The parent delegation and the zone's NS records list the same nameservers.
• ✓ No glue needed #8

  All nameservers are outside the zone, so no glue records are needed.
• ✓ All names resolve #9

  Every nameserver name has an address and is not an alias.
• ✓ Nameservers in different networks #10

  The nameservers are spread over 6 IPv4 /24s and 4 IPv6 /48s.
• i

  All nameservers in one AS

  All nameserver addresses are announced by one network operator (AS13335 (CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc., US): 12 addresses). An outage or attack on that network affects all nameservers; large anycast providers mitigate this, but a secondary DNS provider adds independence.

  #11
• i

  All nameserver names under .com

  All nameserver names are under one TLD, so a problem with that TLD also makes the nameservers unreachable. Some operators use names under two TLDs for extra resilience.

  #12
• ✓ All reachable over IPv6 #13

  Every nameserver has an IPv6 address.

Signed, DS published at parent

Found

Validated by resolver

yes

Denial of existence

NSEC

Signatures valid until

23 October 2026

DS at the parent

DNSKEY in the zone

Checks

• ✓ Signed and validated #27

  The zone is signed, the parent publishes a DS record, and the resolver validates the answers.
• ✓ DS matches a key #28

  The DS record at the parent matches a key in the zone: key tag 2371 (SHA256).
• ✓ Modern algorithms #29

  Key algorithms: ECDSAP256SHA256 (13).
• ✓ Short-lived signatures (online signing) #30

  Signatures are valid for 50h0m0s and created on demand; the current one was made at 2026-10-21 16:10 UTC and expires at 2026-10-23 18:10 UTC.
• i

  NSEC

  The zone uses NSEC, so its full contents can be listed by walking the NSEC chain. That is fine unless the names are sensitive.

  #31

19 records at the apex

Found

Read from

172.64.35.38:53

Checks

• ✓ TTLs within range #32

  TTLs: A 5m, AAAA 5m, MX 5m, NS 1d. The NS TTL at the parent is 1h and in the zone 1d; resolvers may use either.
• ✓ No CNAME at the apex #33

  The zone apex has no CNAME record.
• i

  Wildcard record

  A random name under the zone resolves, so there is a wildcard (*) record. Typos and non-existent hosts resolve too, which can confuse mail and certificate checks.

  #34
• i

  No CAA records

  Without CAA records any certificate authority may issue certificates for this domain. A CAA record limits issuance to the CAs you use.

  #35